Sousveillance

David Brin opens The Transparent Society by describing two cities of the near future. In City Number One:

Tiny cameras panning left and right, survey traffic and pedestrians, observing everything in open view…In this place, all the myriad cameras report their urban scenes straight to Police Central, where security officers use sophisticated image processors to scan for infractions against public order – or perhaps against an established way of thought. Citizens walk the streets aware that any word or deed may be noted by agents of some mysterious bureau.

Over in City Number Two, there are just as many cameras. However:

These devices do not report to the secret police. Rather, each and every citizen of this metropolis can use his or her wristwatch television to call up images from any camera in town.

Here a late-evening stroller checks to make sure no one lurks beyond the corner she is about to turn.

Over there a tardy young man dials to see if his dinner date still waits for him by a city fountain.

A block away, an anxious parent scans the area to find which way her child wandered off.

Over by the mall, a teenage shoplifter is taken into custody gingerly, with minute attention to ritual and rights, because the arresting officer knows that the entire process is being scrutinized by untold numbers who watch intently, lest her neutral professionalism lapse.

Brin closes the thought experiment by asking his readers, given a choice between living in one or the other city, is there any doubt which one we would choose?

I see strong evidence that we are heading for a hybrid of the two.

Both of Brin’s cities resemble practical implementations of the Panopticon. Since a citizen can never be certain that hus actions are not being monitored, hu must assume that they are. Going the way of City Number One, the UK currently sports a ratio of one CCTV camera to every fourteen people. The propagation of CCTV cameras in the United States is far less dense, but is growing in reaction to the July 7, 2005 London bombings.

City Number Two answers Juvenal’s question “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” Who watches the watchmen? We all do. And camera phones and YouTube are making it possible.

Over the past few months we have seen powerful examples of the potential for Sousveillance. Camera phones captured three separate incidents of excessive force on the part of Los Angeles police. A camera phone made Michael Richards’ hate-filled tantrum available for all the world to see. George Allen’s career in politics is probably over because of a single word, and the video camera that recorded it.

In a short while, only the lowest-end mobile phones will come without the capability of recording video, and Jupiter Research estimates that there are 195 million American mobile phone users today.

That’s a lot of eyes and ears.

I am not wild about the prospect (I’d rather we all just let each other the hell alone), but if we’re going to live in a society where the government and the private sector insist on training cameras on us, I prefer for them to know that we’re Shooting Back.

MrPikes, Election Officer Redux

You never forget your first time, do you? In my case it lasted 15 hours, and involved nine partners.

My day as an election officer started at 5:15 am. Our precinct was in a multipurpose room/gymnasium at an elementary school. We set up the signage, registration tables, five electronic voting machines and one demonstration unit with no problems, and opened the polls promptly at 6:00 am. Four volunteers worked the tables, one ran the demonstration unit, three managed the voting machines and two (the Chief and Assistant Chief) managed all procedural aspects of the election, and dealt with stuff like drive-up voting for those with special needs. We had good coverage.

I spent most of the day managing the machines. Once voters checked in, they queued up and presented paper tickets to a volunteer who (after giving the voter an “I Voted!” sticker) directed them to one of two volunteers with smart cards (I was one of these). I escorted each voter to an available machine, and inserted the smart card to activate a new ballot (this procedure serves to eliminate overvoting).

Henrico County uses Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote machines, which my friend Gokmop wrote about last year. They are Windows-based tablet PCs that reside in a plastic suitcase that transforms into a booth (pictured below).

AVS WinVote

Around 9:00 am one of the machines was unplugged and taken outside to allow a drive-up voter to cast hus ballot. When the machine was returned to its station its AC jack was not re-engaged fully, and the machine was inadvertently left to run on batteries. The battery backup is supposed to last 6-8 hours. It managed about 30 minutes before shutting down. When we booted the unit back up, it was in a locked state that required a technician employed by Henrico County to come out and deal with. We were without that machine for maybe 90 minutes. It affected the queue, but I don’t think that anyone waited over 30 minutes total. This was the only glitch of the day, and I consider it minor.

Logistically things ran pretty smoothly. There were a few incidents, such as the man standing in line who had a fairly spectacular diabetic sugar crash. He was quickly and competently attended to, and went on to cast his vote. Interestingly, this incident illustrated the extent to which suspicion has come to inform my perspective. Within seconds of assessing that the man was having a sugar crash and that two of my fellow volunteers were already acting on it, I looked over my shoulder to make sure that no one was messing with any of the machines. Now, before any of my gentle readers start planning the menu for the intervention, let me say that I genuinely believe my level of suspicion still places well up in the Healthy quadrant, but it’s a good thing of which to stay mindful. If I end up wearing foil-lined underpants and arguing with mailboxes, then you can have your intervention. Mark me down for beef.

Meanwhile, back on voting day, the mood was generally pleasant. While waiting for a machine to free up, one voter joked that his sticker was not technically accurate, since he had not yet, in fact, voted. I responded that Henrico County was examining the feasibility of providing stickers that addressed the various states of voting – “I Am About To Vote!”, “I Am Voting!”, “I Voted!”. I also pointed out to him that the sticker was in fact technically accurate if he had ever voted before. Good times.

The convivial atmosphere, for me, evaporated at the machines themselves. Over the course of the day, my dismay turned to quiet anger as I saw a meaningful percentage of citizens struggle to cast their votes. The single most important lesson that I learned on election day was that way too often these slick, new electronic voting machines do not solve the problem that they were designed and purchased to solve, while creating a laundry list of new problems.

The WinVote machines are touch screen. The voter is guided through a series of screens, each corresponding to a ballot item. The voter selects hus desired candidate for each election by touching the candidate’s name. At the end there is a summary screen that displays the voter’s choices, followed by a screen that instructs the voter to press a large flashing box labeled “VOTE” to cast the ballot.

Something about the design of that screen confused a lot of voters. When they reached it they thought they were done, and they walked away from the machine without pressing the flashing box. Maybe 25 times over the course of the day, one of my fellow volunteers or I had to chase after voters to ask them to come back and complete the process. We’re not allowed to press the box ourselves – a voter who walks away without completing the final step has hus vote invalidated. During the busiest part of the day we missed one voter. We tried advising people about the final step as we were escorting them to the machines, but one has to be careful not to over inform people who might already be intimidated by doing something unfamiliar.

The entire day, right inside the entrance to the precinct a volunteer offered straightforward tutorials with a working demonstration machine. A lot of people who really would have benefited from this passed it up either because they they were too proud, or too confident, or in too much of a hurry. Whatever the reason, when they got to the actual voting machines they became our problem. Setting aside the observation that any voting system requiring a tutorial needs rethinking, we had an election to run, and we had the equipment that the county provided to run it.

We could spot those who were going to have trouble within a few seconds of them getting in front of the machines. You could see their posture change as they encountered something unexpected. It wasn’t just the elderly voters, as one might expect. Young, old, black, white, hispanic, men, women – I assisted voters across a wide demographic spectrum.

Election officers can assist voters, but there are rules for going about it. I couldn’t just walk up beside a voter requesting assistance and look at the ballot. That requires the voter to fill out a form that both of us sign, which is time consuming and in most cases overkill. I helped two voters that required this level of attention because they were so entirely lost. The rest of the time I would stand beside the machine and ask the voter to describe the screen in front of hum, without telling me how hu intended to vote. I had the screens memorized so it was usually a simple matter of explaining the basics of navigating around. In some cases all that was necessary was to inform the voter that the system was touch screen. I had opportunities aplenty to refine my spiel, seeing as I delivered it around 100 times.

It’s important to make it explicitly clear that I don’t think the people I’m describing are stupid. The impression I formed was that they were just entirely inexperienced with something that I happen to take for granted – the graphical user interface. In one way or another I’ve been dealing with GUIs since Dad brought home Pong when I was five. I guarantee that it was the first time for many of those whom I assisted on November 7th.

This can be a hard concept for people who are completely comfortable with GUIs to grasp. In describing my election day experiences, I’ve heard numerous responses along the lines of, “It was so easy for me. I can’t imagine anyone having trouble.” Allow me to make a blanket response to this reaction:

  1. The world is full of things that you cannot imagine.
  2. Your inability to imagine them does not make them any less true.
  3. Touch screen voting machines were designed and purchased by people who share your inability.

We do an immense disservice to a meaningful percentage of voters by forcing them use these machines. In my precinct, several voters had thoroughly awful experiences. Some felt intimidated, some felt stupid, and some felt just that one more bit detached from a world that they used to get along in just fine. Was their experience so bad that they might not vote in the next election? I certainly hope not, but it is simply wrong to expect voters to learn a completely unfamiliar technology without at having at least one compelling reason to do so.

I will ask again, “What problem were we trying to solve?”

The usual response is, “Florida, 2000.” Much was made about hanging, pregnant or dimpled chads, and the confusing butterfly ballots. A more generic way of stating the problem is to say, “The method for capturing voter intent was flawed,” and I agree completely. The Help America Vote Act passed in 2002 allocated billions of dollars to the states to fix the problem. Setting aside the Pandora’s Box of problems that the law unleashed, its primary objective remains unrealized, and postmortem articles like the Washington Post’s “Voting System Worked, With Some Hiccups” amount to little more than whistling past the graveyard.

I guess it depends on how low one sets the bar for declaring that something “worked.” Did the voting system “work” because most of the machines didn’t visibly malfunction? Did it “work” because people didn’t have to wait that much longer than they used to? Did it “work” because more voters and election volunteers than not were comfortable setting up and operating the machines? Did it “work” because at the end of the day most of the non-auditable black boxes produced totals that added up to the total number of people who checked in?

We can do so much better than this. We can start by demanding that our voting system be great, not merely good enough.

My day as an election officer was highly educational and worthwhile, and I look forward to doing it again. The people with whom I worked were top shelf – genuinely dedicated to ensuring a fair and accurate election. They were also very kind and accepting of me, a first-timer and a snot-nosed whippersnapper. We had opportunities to chat during brief lulls in the day. We talked about how good the turnout was, we compared home addresses and made fun of the new McMansion™ development nearby. We talked about past elections, and our concerns with or confidence in the new machines. Leaving the gym at 8:00 pm, I knew that whatever shortcomings our current voting system has, people like these nine were certainly not among them.

Why I Don’t Say The Pledge of Allegiance

In my last post I mentioned that whenever I’m at a venue where the Pledge of Allegiance is recited, I stand with my hands at my sides. I only mentioned it because when I wrote that post I was initially jotting down impressions and recollections while they were fresh. I included it as a detail. One of my gentle readers pointed out that without providing an explanation as to why, people would be left to fill in their own conclusions. Well, we mustn’t have that.

Why I Stand

This started in homeroom my Junior year of high school. Every morning before we went to our first class, we said the Pledge. For reasons that I’ll get to, I decided that I wasn’t going to do it anymore. When everyone else stood, I did not. The homeroom teacher was furious with me, and sent me to the office.

Neither the principal nor the vice-principal was in, but I was a regular and received assurances that one or the other would be in touch. I was on my way to get a smoke over at Chez Boys when I felt a hand on my shoulder. It was Ms. Henderson, the vice-principal.

Donna was an older, handsome blonde woman whom I had learned not to piss off. We were at present enjoying a shaky detente. She politely asked me what had occurred, and why I no longer wanted to say the Pledge. I explained it to her (I swear, I’ll get to it). She didn’t say anything for several moments and then – it was probably the first time someone addressed me as if I were an adult – said, “I understand. What I would ask for you to consider is that the Pledge is something that some people believe in very strongly. Out of respect for what they believe, maybe you could just stand?” A light went on as I learned that it was possible to be true to my own beliefs without being unnecessarily confrontational.

Thank you, Donna. You taught me something which still helps me to go my own way.

Why I Don’t Sing Along

It would be disrespectful for me to recite it.

Allegiance – The obligation of a subject or citizen to hus sovereign or government.

None for me, thank you. I consider my contract with the United States adequate in its current form. I pay my taxes fair and square and, in exchange, I enjoy access to infrastructure and public safety – no need to get all gushy with a bunch of talk about allegiance. I want government involved in my life as little as possible. I wouldn’t swear allegiance to my bank, so why on earth would I swear allegiance to my government?

If I were to put my hand over my heart and say the words, believing as I do, I would be showing disrespect to those who genuinely believe. It’s the same reason I don’t take communion on those occasions when I attend Catholic Mass. I do not believe in Transubstantiation, so I have absolutely no business taking communion. It would be rude.

It scares the shit out of me.

If you’re a believer, the next time the Pledge comes up, close your eyes and just mouth the words (it’s okay, the Flag will give you a pass) so you can hear what a room full of people reciting the Pledge sounds like. It sounds like a bunch of zombies saying grace before tucking into the buffet. “With liberty and *braaaiiiinnnnnnss* for all.” I’m not kidding, it freaks me out.

Deeds Not Words

Which is more important: That I recite a Pledge in which I do not believe, or that I engage (without irony) in civic-minded activities like being an election volunteer?

Origins of the Pledge

The Pledge is not the Declaration of Independence, is not the Constitution, is not the Bill of Rights. Our founders never heard of it. Wikipedia has a fascinating article on its origins. My favorite bit of history about the Pledge is the Bellamy Salute (pictured below):

Bellamy Salute

Hooboy.

Reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in a group setting imbues the gathering with a solemnity and sense of occasion that works just fine for some. I cannot engage in this ritual honestly, so I simply pay respect and leave it at that.

You got a problem with that?

MrPikes, Election Officer

Last night I attended Henrico County, Virginia’s Election Officer Training. It took an hour. I am given to understand that it might have gone longer, but apparently West Virginia was playing Louisville (Go Mountaineers!).

I decided to volunteer as an election worker for two reasons:

  1. Coming from a technical background I thought I might be helpful.
  2. I genuinely want to participate in our election process.

At 34 years of age, I stuck out like a pregnant prom queen – the average age of election workers being 70 – but I was prepared for that. I was less prepared for the Pledge of Allegiance (I politely stood, with my hands at my sides), and was even less prepared for the social aspect of the gathering. A lot of my fellow volunteers knew each other, which makes sense in retrospect, but at the time I would not have been surprised to see people begin producing casseroles.

Around 40 of us went to a separate room to receive training on the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines. Henrico uses Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote machines, which my friend Gokmop wrote about last year.

The fact that they communicate with each other wirelessly for end-of-election tabulation still concerns me deeply. Wireless is inherently more insecure than wired, even with badass encryption, and 128-bit WEP (which is what WinVote uses) is demonstrably lame.

The training was exclusively confined to the setup and operation of the machines. Not one word was spoken about what to do when the machines malfunctioned. Presumably the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs receive more thorough training on what to do when things go wrong, and there is always the Registrar hotline to fall back on. Still, I felt like the omission had more to do with convincing the poll workers that the machines were reliable. I saw a lot of wide eyes during our training.

Here’s a little thought experiment – imagine overhearing the following at a voting precinct using paper ballots:

Chief, this stylus won’t move. Can you come over here and unbudge it?

Sir, can you help me? I’m trying to punch this hole, but it keeps unpunching itself.

I need another ballot. The one I was using just crumpled itself up, then burst into flames.

Um, what problem were we trying to solve again?

DRE Voting Machines

The right of voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected.
– Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, 1791

I just finished Avi Rubin’s book Brave New Ballot. I’ve been keeping up with the issues surrounding electronic voting since I read RiSC’s 2004 Red Team report (167KB pdf) on the serious, practical security vulnerabilities uncovered in Diebold’s Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines.

Aside: While researching this post I discovered that DRE is also a medical acronym for Digital (think finger) Rectal Examination. Oh my.

The State of Maryland commissioned RiSC’s review (as well as an analysis by the SAIC – 1227KB pdf) to certify the machines were credible and secure, in response to a non-commissioned paper co-published by Dr. Avi Rubin. This paper concluded that the Diebold machines were fundamentally insecure, based on analysis of source code that Diebold had inadvertently made public. The SAIC and RiSC reports went on to uncover additional, serious flaws.

In addition, just this month, Princeton researchers published yet another study (with video) that, among other problems, demonstrates that Diebold machines can be infected with a vote-altering virus, spread via the machines’ memory cards.

I find these reports fascinating reading. Some of my gentle readers may not, so I will highlight some of their findings below. Bear in mind that Diebold typically rebuts the results of unauthorized analyses of their machines by stating something to the effect that the code/machines analyzed were several generations old, no longer used by any voting precincts in the country, identify purely theoretical attacks, and so on.

I simply ask you to consider that a) the authorized reviews conducted using up-to-date machines/code confirmed that many of these flaws were still present; b) outdated or no, these flaws were at one time present in actual machines in actual, recent elections; and c) at present, we basically have to take Diebold’s word for it.

Now, the highlights:

  • The smart cards used to ensure that an individual can vote only once are easily cloned or reinitialized to allow multiple votes.
  • Supervisor PINs and passwords are either hard-coded, stored in plain text, or have defaults such as 1111. With Supervisor access, an individual could tell a machine that the election was over, clear the results, vote multiple times, or change passwords (thus locking out precinct judges).
  • The locks used to secure the machines are identically keyed, easily picked, and common. The same model of lock is used to secure jukeboxes, desk drawers and hotel minibars.
  • The algorithm used to randomize the order of the voting records (to preserve voter anonymity) is inappropriate to the task. What’s more, the programmers put the following comment in the code:

    // LCG – Linear Conguential Generator – used to generate ballot serial numbers
    // A psuedo-random-sequence generator
    // (per Applied Cryptography, by Bruce Schneier, Wiley, 1996)

    What is painful is that Schneier explicitly states in Applied Cryptography:

    Unfortunately, linear congruential generators cannot be used for cryptography; they are predictable.

  • Both the voting machine software and the Global Election Management System (GEMS) server (central tabulation server) sit atop Windows operating systems consisting of millions of lines of code and, ahem, praised by one and all for their flawless security.
  • Analysis of the GEMS server determined that it was 15 Windows patches out of date. At least one of these was a critical security patch (made available the previous year) whose exploitation gave the attacker complete control of the machine.
  • The GEMS database was written in Microsoft Access – a tinkertoy.
  • Votes can be transmitted from the precinct to the GEMS server via dialup modem. The phone number, user name, password and IP address of the server are stored in plain text in the Windows registry. With this information, an attacker could impersonate a voting machine and/or intercept and alter election results in real time.

The most significant problem with these machines is not a security flaw per se, though it greatly magnifies the impact of all other vulnerabilities. No independent, valid audit trail exists to prove that a given machine produced accurate counts. Incidentally, the same can be said for gear and lever voting machines, which went into service in 1913.

Moving to optical scanners that could read and tabulate counts of paper ballots was a huge improvement, but the mechanism by which voters applied their intent to the ballot was flawed (butterfly ballots, chads in various states of repose, and so on). Could the optical scanners be hacked? Certainly, but I haven’t read up on it. For all I know there could be a little man inside who takes the ballot, then presses a button that corresponds to the candidate. Perhaps the little man could be blackmailed. If elections are done right, however, the little man doesn’t matter, and here’s why:

  1. In order to sway a national election, you have to get dirt on a bunch of little men.
  2. If a precinct, county or state produced suspicious election results, election officials have paper ballots to recount manually, under the bi-partisan scrutiny of people of average or greater height.

Rubin makes this fundamental distinction in Brave New Ballot – the difference between retail and wholesale fraud. Stuffing or “disappearing” ballot boxes is retail fraud. Surreptitiously altering software subsequently placed on tens of thousands of voting machines is wholesale fraud. Another example is hacking the central server to which election results are uploaded.

And remember, with these machines, meaningful recounts are impossible.

Per the Princeton report, in the 2006 general election Diebold machines will be used in 357 counties, responsible for capturing and counting the intent of nearly 10 percent of registered voters. That’s just the Diebold machines. Overall, 34 percent of counties will use touch-screen voting systems in 2006. However, only seven states will employ machines that produce a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT).

Hacking voting machines (or a central server) requires intent. However, merely introducing the complexity of electronic hardware and software causes problems of its own. For example, in the 2004 presidential election, over 4,500 votes were lost in Carteret County, North Carolina due to a memory card storage problem in a machine manufactured by Unilect. In a Columbus, Ohio suburban precinct of 800 registered voters, a machine manufactured by Danaher Controls recorded 4,258 votes for one candidate.

Setting aside whether or not these issues would sway a given election, what matters is that voters’ intent was lost. Voters whose confidence in these machines is low are that much less likely to vote. And casting absentee ballots as an alternative to using the machines is a problematic solution.

Bruce Schneier enumerates four fundamental requirements of a robust voting system: Accuracy, Anonymity, Scalability and Speed. I assert that only the first two are fundamental, while the last two are gravy.

  • Accuracy – Each voter’s intent is captured. Every legitimate vote and only legitimate votes are counted.
  • Anonymity – It is not possible to couple a voter with hus vote.

Avi Rubin’s “dream voting machine” would accomplish all four of Schneier’s requirements. Rubin describes this machine as follows:

My dream voting machine would have a user interface much like a DRE, but in reality it wouldn’t be a voting machine at all. I call it a “ballot marking machine.” Voters would navigate through touch screens, just as with a DRE, and make their choices for candidates and for ballot resolutions. However, instead of clicking on Cast Vote at the end, they would select a Print Ballot option, and the machine would produce a filled-in paper ballot that the voter would be able to check for accuracy. The layout and typography of the ballots would be standardized, and the count would proceed completely independently from the the ballot-marking process, in some cases even by hand. One possible variation would use optical scanners to count the ballots, provided that the manufacturer of the scanners had no ties of any kind to the manufacturer of the ballot-marking machine. Similarly, scanners outfitted with audio output could assist blind voters, who would feed their marked ballot into the machine for verification. The marked paper ballots could be retained by election officials and used for recounts, either in cases of actual dispute or as part of a random spot-checking system…The ideal machine would have all the useful features of a DRE but would improve upon it in several key ways. It would allow for meaningful recounts of voter intent and would make it incredibly difficult for a vendor to rig an election. Most significantly, the system would provide citizens with the confidence that their votes were recorded and transmitted accurately and could not be altered after the fact.

Our voting system is hugely important. It should be a point of national pride, trusted and understood by all citizens, and used as the gold standard worldwide. It is far too precious a thing to entrust to proprietary machines produced by companies whose interests are primarily financial.

Recommendations

If we’re going to use DREs, these criteria must be met:

  • The software of every DRE and tabulation server put into service must be subjected to transparent, independent peer review. A method must exist to verify that the code on a given machine matches what was reviewed.
  • DREs must produce a paper ballot that each voter can use to verify hus intent was recorded accurately. The ballots comprise the official count, not the machine totals.
  • Machines fail and require power. In the event of a catastrophic failure, every voting precinct must have an adequate backup supply of paper ballots and a printout of registered voters.

If you are disenfranchised by your state’s voting system, please write your Congressional representatives. For more information on current proposed legislation, visit verifiedvoting.org.

Intended Consequences

Okay, so this jackass Jason Fortuny posed as a woman seeking BDSM sex on the Seattle Craig’s List personals. On his LiveJournal page he stated that he was conducting an experiment to see how many responses he could get in 24 hours. He got 178. The majority included images, which ranged in content from headshots to genitalia. He then posted the replies (NSFW) online.

That is, he posted the replies online, in their entirety, including e-mail addresses, IM handles and phone numbers.

Holy crap.

Now 178 people, none of whom did anything illegal, find that what was ostensibly personal correspondence is displayed for all the world to see. That’s just plain wrong.

Did some of these fellows demonstrate breathtaking ignorance by sending their replies from business or otherwise “non-throw-away” e-mail accounts, using their full names and images including their faces? Absolutely. Having read the responses, I can say with confidence that the reputations of future Nobel Prize winners remain intact.

So? Ignorance isn’t criminal (thank God). Otherwise we would just slap a lid over the United States and have done with it. That’s not the point. This was no “experiment.” It was a juvenile, malicious prank with no purpose other than to inflict harm, then chortle smugly at those exposed. Only a truly damaged person behaves like that.

Abraham Lincoln said:

Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character, give him power.

Jason Fortuny entrapped a bunch of guys looking for no-strings rough sex. His power came from offering something that these men wanted. He then used that power to burn them publicly, for no other reason than that he could.

I offer two things to consider:

  1. As my friend Gokmop has reminded me several times, do not put anything online (via web site, blog, forum, e-mail, whatever) that you don’t want made available and searchable, forever.
  2. I posted an article about instances where actions on the Internet cross over into Real Life™. Jason Fortuny may well experience the downside of that phenomenon.

Size Matters

Slashdot recently posted this article on scaling and I found it just fascinating. The essential idea is that the properties of physical structures are dependent on their scale, e.g., a flea could not jump 130 times its own height if it were 1,000 times larger.

Galileo wrote about this in the 17th century, Haldane wrote a wonderful, accessible essay about it in 1928, and this fellow LaBarbera applies the principle as it relates to (some of my favorite) B-Movies.

Your Ring Tone Sucks

Unsurprisingly, ring tones have joined branded clothing, vanity plates and the vehicles attached to those vanity plates, as emblems of individual expression. People are out there right now asking themselves (apologies to Chuck Palahniuk), “What sort of ring tone defines me as a person?”

Hava Nagila?

Super Mario Brothers?

‘Memory’ from Cats?

He’s Got the Whole World in His Hands?

Sanford and Son?

For those of you struggling with this decision, my suggestion is to turn the question around. Ask instead “What does it say about me as a person that I would deliberately subject friends, colleagues and complete strangers to irritating little spurts of noise pollution that in turn precede the infliction of longer, more irritating intervals of one-half of a conversation?”

It’s like the prick of a dentist’s needle before lengthy drilling, except at the dentist’s at least you know it’s coming and that it’s for your own good. That’s right, bad cell phone manners are broadcast dentistry performed on the unsuspecting.

I have this swell fantasy where I walk straight up to a person whose phone is ejaculating the William Tell Overture and let them have it with a belt from an aeresol-powered, portable air horn.

So the next time your phone begins bleating ‘Where Have All the Flowers Gone?’ and you see me smiling, either I’m thinking my happy thought, or the package recently arrived.

Hey, No Fair Using "Tiger Hand"

A federal judge, fed up with two attorneys unable to agree upon the simplest of logistical decisions, ordered them to settle their latest impasse with a round of Rock Paper Scissors (CNN has the ruling).

The issue at hand is the venue at which a deposition will be held, and the winner gets to choose. My favorite part is that the ruling specifies that this battle of wills is to take place:

…at a neutral site agreeable to both parties. If counsel cannot agree on a neutral site, they shall meet on the front steps of the Sam M. Gibbons U.S. Courthouse, 801 North Florida Ave., Tampa, Florida 33602.

In reading about this, I discovered that Rock Paper Scissors enjoys a great deal more interest and creative offshoots than I ever realized. There is a world championship, a strategy guide, political satire, cartoons and game variants involving up to 25 different possible throws. I was most amused by Rock Paper Scissors Spock Lizard.

Update – 7/4/2006: The epic showdown did not take place. Instead the attorneys, successfully chastened by Judge Presnell’s “alternative dispute resolution,” settled the matter beforehand. The article goes on to mention previous methods that Judge Presnell has used to “spur cooperation.” My favorite is the practical embodiment of Rawls’ Original Position. In a divorce proceeding, Presnell had one party make two lists, dividing the property any way hu saw fit, with the understanding that the other spouse would get to pick the list hu wanted.

Aqueous Equinox

With Summer Solstice nearly upon us, I thought I would share one of my personal favorite markers of time’s cyclic passage, the Aqueous Equinox. This twice-yearly event occurs when the hot and cold water taps on full result in the perfect shower temperature. The things I like best about the Aqueous Equinox are:

  1. The Aqueous Equinox can be savored since each one potentially lasts for a few weeks. This is unlike, say, the Autumnal Equinox which is over in an instant.
  2. Other arbitrary milestones like Hump Day or Casual Friday are one-size-fits-all. Since “perfect shower temperature” is entirely subjective, each Aqueous Equinox feels like it’s just for you.

Acronym Salad: AT&T, NSA, EFF, FISA, OMFG

On January 31st 2006, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a class action lawsuit against AT&T, accusing the company of giving the National Security Agency direct access to AT&T customers’ telephone and Internet communications and records, without a warrant. Of course, without a warrant. AT&T’s network handles millions of calls a day, and thousands of terabytes of data. According to the EFF, these data affect 73 million U.S. households. Since they can’t all be terrorist suspects, the very idea of a warrant, even one provided by the super-secret, highly permissive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is ludicrous. Warrants are born of targeted, specific requests supported by probable cause. NSA access to these data bears none of those hallmarks. However, the EFF’s suit is against AT&T, not the NSA. The relevant laws pertain to the obligation of telecommunications providers to protect the confidentiality of customer data, dating back to the Telecommunications Act of 1934 (955KB pdf).

On May 15th, 2006 the United States government filed a motion to dismiss the suit, citing the “state secrets” privilege. This legal precedent dates back to 1953 and gives the United States government the power to dismiss lawsuits that it claims would compromise national security. The outcome of this filing is not yet known.

I believe that the United States government’s motive to get the suit dismissed is not about the sensitivity of the information that would be disclosed in court, but about the precedent that would be set if AT&T loses. At present, the NSA’s domestic spying program operates in a bubble of legal uncertainty. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is the authoritative law regarding both foreign and domestic surveillance, and it makes this warrantless, wholesale hoovering of purely domestic communications spectacularly illegal. However, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has stated that the program is legal under the presidential powers given by Congress in the days following September 11th, 2001. Specifically, Congress “authorize[d] the President to use all necessary and appropriate force,” which, of course, could include just about anything.

By going after a source of the data (AT&T), and the laws that govern telecommunications data, the EFF avoids miring its resources in the government’s “it’s legal because we say it’s legal” quicksand. True to its current form, the United States Government responded by moving to “disappear” the lawsuit. Otherwise, the government risks the court ruling that AT&T broke the law, and must therefore rescind the NSA’s data access, and pay damages to each affected customer to the tune of at least $21,000 each. The other telecoms would then respond by doing what Qwest did, which was ask for a FISA warrant or a document signed by the Attorney General stating that the request is legal. To do otherwise would expose them to liability.

Here’s hoping.

Update, 5/22/2006 8:45pm: Wired.com just made public the AT&T internal documents and testimony of Mark Klein, former AT&T technician and whistleblower. The court had put these documents under seal, but Wired felt that “the public’s right to know the full facts in this case outweighs AT&T’s claims to secrecy.”